Trump hysteria has once again proved misplaced, and the same applies to the vilification of those who called for diplomatic efforts rather than confrontation over Greenland. For Trump did not take Greenland by force, and no Danes would have supported that.
Instead, we have obtained a predictable agreement, but one that nevertheless makes difficult reading for idealists who have forgotten all about realism, spheres of interest and brutal great-power politics.
The agreement supplements the 1951 agreement and affirms the sovereignty of the Kingdom and Greenlanders’ right to self-determination.
Structures matter far more than individuals, including Trump. Any president would have made the same demands as Trump. A Democrat would merely have done so more politely. And the demand was for guarantees from which an independent Greenland cannot walk away. The new agreement provides precisely these guarantees. The advantages could have been achieved without a new agreement, but Washington wanted them in writing.
The agreement is an answer and a solution – and, as in all great-power politics, a temporary solution – to three geopolitical conflicts that have intensified in our time and that will outlast Trump.
The first conflict concerns the retreat of the ice, making the Arctic navigable for merchant ships and military fleets. The Russian Northern Fleet (Kola) must pass through the GIUK gap to reach the Atlantic. The United States’ attempt to buy Greenland as early as 1946 was due not least to this circumstance.
The United States has resolved the conflict by establishing itself in new defence areas, with Narsarsuaq in the south and Mestersvig in the east. Narsarsuaq will become a hub for the North Atlantic, while Mestersvig provides a view over the GIUK gap and the approach to the Northeast Passage. Together with Pituffik in the north-west, the United States now covers three corners of the North Atlantic.
The second conflict concerns controlling the space above the North Pole with satellites and missile systems; the shortest missile trajectory between Russia and North America passes over the North Pole. The agreement resolves the conflict for the United States, which will now modernise and expand Pituffik Space Base. Golden Dome is also mentioned in the preamble to the agreement as a response to the conflict over space.
That this is highly topical is evident from the fact that a Russian expert on RT confirms that the Arctic is the obvious route for intercontinental missiles carrying nuclear weapons, and that the American presence is regarded precisely as an acute threat. Control of outer space is, in other words, of decisive importance to the balance of power.
The third conflict concerns Greenland as a geopolitical anomaly, namely that Denmark claims sovereignty over a territory in the middle of the United States’ sphere of interest, despite lacking the ability to enforce this sovereignty militarily. And in reality, that means a non-existent sovereignty, since sovereignty is linked to the ability to provide security. If the United States defends Greenland, why, then, is Denmark sovereign?
This anomaly was tolerable to the United States at a time of low rivalry with the other great powers. But the rise of Russia and China intensified the conflict, and the Self-Government Act (selvstyreloven) of 2009 increased the uncertainty over who will guarantee security in, for example, twenty years’ time. Greenlanders have, after all, already toyed with the idea of giving the Chinese access to critical infrastructure, with the infamous idea that China should build an airport in 2018. The Americans naturally will not and would not tolerate that.
The agreement resolves this conflict by stipulating that states outside NATO may not establish military installations, and that investors from countries that are neither members of NATO, NATO partners nor EU countries cannot obtain control over particularly sensitive sectors such as critical infrastructure and the extraction of raw materials. This naturally entails a certain real loss of sovereignty for Greenland. That is the price a small country must pay for being located where fate has, fortunately or unfortunately, placed it.
The future? It will be interesting. For at some point there will be resistance from Moscow and Beijing. It will also be costly. For Denmark commits itself to strengthening defence in the Arctic on land, at sea, in the air and in space.
The free lunch is over.
