The United States’ shifting and indecisive policy towards Iran may be perceived as a sign of weakness, not only by the Iranian regime, but also by other authoritarian states. When the world’s most powerful military power threatens action, while simultaneously moving between military strikes, sanctions and negotiations, the adversary gains greater room for manoeuvre.
The Iranian regime, with the Revolutionary Guard as a central power factor, has become increasingly aggressive. The conflict has also spread to US bases and allies in the region, while the Strait of Hormuz has become an important means of pressure for Tehran.
For every day the conflict continues without a clear strategy, the Iranian regime may gain greater opportunity to press its demands. But in my opinion, there is also another explanation for the American vacillation. Trump may have made a strategic error when he believed that the kind of policy used against Venezuela could produce a similar result in Iran.
The situations are naturally different. But after the Venezuela operation, there may have been an expectation in Washington that strong military force combined with economic pressure could quickly force a political outcome in Iran as well. An analysis from Washington points precisely to the possibility that Trump and his advisers may have expected Iran to be weakened and destabilised quickly, as they perceived the developments in Venezuela.
But Iran was not Venezuela. The Iranian regime and the Revolutionary Guard had both the capacity and the will to strike back. This gave rise to the difficult question:
What was the United States to do after the initial strategy failed to produce the result that had been hoped for?
Was the objective to weaken the regime? Force it into an agreement? Remove its leaders? Or actually bring about the fall of the entire regime? When the objective is unclear, the way forward also becomes unclear. That may be part of the explanation for why US policy towards Iran has appeared so changeable: first threats, then military force, followed by negotiations, new demands, sanctions and new threats.
Today, Trump has once again returned to economic pressure, after military strikes and other measures failed quickly to produce the result the United States wanted. AP describes precisely this latest shift and points to criticism that the United States’ strategic objectives have not been sufficiently clear.
The problem is not that the United States lacks military strength. The problem is that military force without a clear political objective can become a trap. And this may be precisely where the Iranian regime has gained greater room for manoeuvre. When Tehran perceives that Washington itself is uncertain about how the conflict is to be brought to an end, the regime can press harder, make greater demands and buy itself time.
But this is not only about Iran. Perhaps the most dangerous thing is the signal being sent to the rest of the world. Russia is watching closely. If Moscow perceives that the United States is militarily tied down in Iran, while Washington is simultaneously having difficulty achieving a clear result, Putin may become more confident that Russia can put even greater pressure on Ukraine.
And China is watching from the other side of the globe. If Beijing perceives that the United States looks weak or paralysed in the face of Iran, Chinese leaders may begin calculating what this means for Taiwan.
This does not mean that Russia will necessarily escalate the war in Ukraine, or that China will necessarily attempt to take Taiwan. But great powers study one another’s weaknesses. CFR’s 2026 assessment points precisely to an intensification of the Russia–Ukraine war and a crisis between China and Taiwan as among the scenarios with a high level of consequences for US interests.
Authoritarian regimes do not merely pay attention to what the United States says. They look at what the United States actually does.
A military superpower may possess the world’s strongest weapons, but if its adversaries perceive its policy as vacillating, those weapons lose some of their deterrent power. There is a difference between being weak and looking weak. And in this US–Iran conflict, the United States looks weak.
In international politics, the latter can be almost as dangerous as the former. For while the great powers assess one another’s strength, it is ordinary people who pay the price.
In Iran, the population pays the price for a brutal regime. In neighbouring countries, Iranian attacks and the regional struggle for power create fear and instability. And the longer the conflict continues without a clear way out of it, the greater the risk that it will develop in a direction over which no one any longer has full control.
A great power does not always need to use its strength. But the world must believe that the great power has the will to use it when it truly matters. That is why the question is not merely how strong the US military and military technology are.
The question is also: Does the United States have a clear strategy, and does the country have the will to see it through? For when the world’s strongest democracy begins to hesitate, others begin to calculate.
Russia does.
China does.
Iran does.
And that could become a very dangerous calculation.