It was in September, 35 years ago, that the Soviet Union began to disintegrate from within and officially dissolved itself three months later. This sparked political euphoria in Western countries, and a state of uncertainty and panic in several of the former ‘union subjects’ (Soviet states), which suddenly had to fend for themselves, without the reassuring guiding hand from Moscow, which they had been able to blame for all the economic and social misery they were burdened with.
One of the many critical issues on which people were feverishly working to find a long-term solution, was what to do with the many thousands of nuclear warheads, of various types and sizes, that were stored across several of the new independent states, particularly in countries such as Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and as the Russian Federation came under President Yeltsin’s control, there were also struggles with ‘centrifugal forces’ in some of the ‘federal subjects’, i.e. the ‘autonomous republics’, such as Komi and Karelia. However, they eventually came under reliable and stable administration from Moscow, and thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons were secured by President Yeltsin. At that time, Putin was one of Yeltsin’s loyal supporters in St Petersburg.
After it was officially announced from Moscow that agreements had been reached whereby all deployed weapon systems, including nuclear weapons of any kind, were to be taken over and transported to the defence authorities of the Russian Federation for future storage, and that this process had been secured, Western countries accepted the situation, and the issue was deemed to be under control. This was in the early 1990s, the defining moment for détente and the end of the Cold War, which had lasted for 45 years.
The end of the Cold War and the normalisation of relations with the former Soviet states and the Warsaw Pact countries in EasternEurope immediately created a euphoric atmosphere at the political level in the West, where people now envisaged a world of peace and harmony, with growth and prosperity and the integration of the whole of Europe into a common economic and political development area with endless possibilities.
Something that overlooked in the rush was that one of the strongest and most important driving forces behind the Western economy, both in Europe and in the US, was what President Eisenhower had in his day characterised as ‘the military-industrial complex’. This complex was not at all pleased that international tensions and the Cold War were no longer to be a determining factor in budgetary processes. The salvation came from the Middle East, where Saddam Hussein in Baghdad and the ayatollahs in Tehran were trying to get back on their feet after their bloody eight-year war, which cost a million lives, achieving nothing other than fuelling a renewed spiral of military armament both there and in the West.
However, the hopeless and costly stalemate between the two neighbouring countries in the Middle East gave rise to a demand for more effective weaponry, and, in particular, a desire to make greater headway through the use of weapons of mass destruction. Both countries focused on nuclear power as a possible starting point for the future development of nuclear weapons. Iraq also focused on the development of chemical weapons as an alternative. However, as early as 1980, the Iraqi nuclear reactor was destroyed by the Israelis, who feared that Iraq might eventually develop nuclear weapons. The Iranian nuclear weapons programme, however, was not so easy to eliminate. It was allowed to develop right up to the present day, as it is no longer concealed that one of its aims is to enable the production of nuclear weapons.
However, there is currently an internal debatewithin the Iranian regime regarding whether it is tactically wise to pursue nuclear weapons. An important step in that case would be to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), to which the country has been a signatory since 1970. Neither the US nor Israel is in any doubt that Iran is holding on to the option of building nuclear weapons within a short timeframe. The country has therefore, for all practical purposes, already committed to nuclear weapons, given that it has enriched large quantities of uranium to up to 60 per cent purity, which is the stage prior to bomb-grade material. For civilian purposes, a purity of no more than 10 per cent is required. From the perspective of Israel and the US, accession to the NPT has served only to camouflage the true purpose of the nuclear weapons programme. This view is reinforced by reports that within the regime in Tehran there is now open talk about abandoning the ambiguous policy which no one believes in anyway.
The more pressing question for Israel and the US is therefore what capacity the Iranian authorities may still have, following the air strikes earlier this year, to produce a functioning nuclear weapon. If the regime has managed to keep this capability safe from the hostilities and has continued work on a functional warhead, how close are they then to a bomb, or more importantly: Do they already have the bomb, but are waiting for a politically favourable moment to carry out a test explosion?
We do not know this, but the debate over the Iranian nuclear bomb is not new. Ever since the Soviet Union collapsed in the early 1990s there have been claims that the Iranian authorities managed to purchase 2–3 operational nuclear weapons, or components for such weapons, from Kazakhstan. This was later strongly denied by both the Russian and American sides (CIA), but the suspicion that this might nevertheless be the case has persisted. If this were to be true, Iran may already possess a version of a nuclear weapon, even though, as things stand, it would not be possible to deploy these in war. Might they nevertheless be suitable for a ‘test explosion’?
The person who most tenaciously clung to the story of this arms purchase was an American named Yossef Bodansky, who at the time served as director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. He later wrote several books about his experiences. He recounts the story of the Iranian nuclear weapons purchase in the book The High Cost of Peace, which was published in 2002, a full ten years after the events and long after the allegations had been officially and categorically rejected by the relevant authorities. There are, however, reasons to believe that a person in such a prominent position, with immediate access to intelligence information, would hardly have published such a book if he knew that what he was saying could not be true. His entire book is packed with detailed information from a host of intelligence operations, and is still worth reading as historical background to current events in the Middle East.
Given the topical nature of the issue, I therefore think it may be worth quoting some of what Bodansky writes on the matter at hand. It is, in fact, difficult to imagine a more reliable publicly available source on this matter (the quotation has been translated by the undersigned):
“Even before the final collapse of the Soviet Union, and whilst Tehran was initiating talks with Beijing, Iranian intelligence agents were scouring Soviet Central Asia for weapons, technology and nuclear material – in the hope of finding a shortcut to operational nuclear capability. In the summer of 1991, one of these agents was offered access to nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan. Tehran sent a delegation comprising senior officials – including physicists educated in the US – who returned convinced that the offer was genuine. In early September, the Iranian delegation returned to Kazakhstan to resume negotiations. Their Kazakh counterpart stated that he represented a group of around twenty-five people from the security services, research communities and the civil service who were willing to procure ‘nuclear bombs’ for Iran. The weapons were to be collected in parts from various locations in Central Asia, and the group would then assemble the parts into operational weapons. At the same time, the Iranians and their allies embarked on an extensive programme to acquire delivery systems – both ballistic missiles and fighter aircraft.
These developments strengthened Tehran’s belief that it could carry out its overarching strategic plan. As Hashemi-Rafsanjani put it later that year, it fell to Iran to provide nuclear weapons for the entire region – if for no other reason than that the Arab countries had proved incapable of doing so. Such weapons would be the key to a renewed and vibrant Islamic unity. With them, Hashemi-Rafsanjani concluded, it would be possible to remove the Western presence in the Middle East and liberate Jerusalem. The Syrian Chief of Defence, General Hikmat al-Shihabi, made similar remarks during a visit to Tehran, where the two countries’ defence policies were discussed. Shihabi emphasised that Syria did not attend the Madrid peace conference to make peace with Israel, but rather ‘to secure the rights of the Palestinians and regain all occupied territories’.
In December, the agreement in Kazakhstan became a reality, and Iran made its first purchase of nuclear weapons. The agreement comprised two 40-kilotonne warheads, designed for Scud-type ballistic missiles, one aerial bomb of a type that can be delivered by a MiG-27 aircraft, and one nuclear artillery shell (152 mm). These weapons achieved initial operational status at the end of January 1992, and full operational status a few months later.” (Bodansky pp. 76–77)
We are currently observing that the debate regarding possible Iranian nuclear weapons has intensified in the media in the Middle East. The internal debate in Iran on whether the country should remain a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is part of this picture. Another feature is the apparent calm we can observe within the Iranian regime regarding the consequences of the war’s course so far. Iran still has surprisingly good control over traffic in the Strait of Hormuz, nor does it appear to be arguing as though it had been completely defeated in the nuclear weapons arena. Rather, it sounds as though there is uncertainty within the US and Israel as to whether they actually managed to completely dismantle the nuclear weapons programme in February–March. There is nothing to suggest that the Iranian regime considers itself defeated.
A characteristic of the Iranian regime is the strong influence of the Shia Islamic faith on its actions and attitudes. Shia Islam is an eschatological doctrine characterised by a spirit of patient long-termism. One can negotiate endlessly; there is no rush to reach a conclusion. Since they are already convinced that they will ultimately prevail, all that remains is to maintain the system and keep things running. Time is on their side regardless, however long it may take. The liberation of Jerusalem will, in any case, only take place when the time is right. The means to achieve the final victory are in their hands.