Norway today finds itself in a unique foreign-policy position by having a Foreign Minister who has acquired the status of persona non grata in Israel and at the same time was unwelcome in Washington. This raises questions of principle concerning Norway’s ability to advance national interests in the most important forums for interaction with allies. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Jonas Gahr Støre chooses to continue a political course in which Foreign Minister Espen Barth Eide operates under these constraints.

When traditional diplomatic channels in the West are to some extent closed, it may appear that alternative arenas are being sought. Espen Barth Eide visited Lebanon and Syria on 24–25 August:

“I am visiting Syria and Lebanon to demonstrate Norway’s support for the two countries, each of which in its own way faces major challenges. In Syria, the population and the authorities have begun reconstruction after 14 years of civil war. In Lebanon, the population in large parts of the country lives under a constant threat of new Israeli attacks,” says the Foreign Minister. “Norway has a significant political and aid commitment in the two countries. This year, Norway will contribute NOK 420 million to Syria and NOK 336 million to Lebanon. The support goes, among other things, towards reconstruction, measures in health and energy, mine clearance and humanitarian aid.”

It is disturbing that Barth Eide, in his communication, mentions the population but fails to mention the terrorist organisation Hezbollah, controlled by the terrorist regime in Iran, which has held Lebanon in an iron grip for several decades and has carried out countless terrorist attacks against Israel. Nor does he address Turkey’s de facto occupation of large parts of Syria. Instead, a threat from Israel is presented as the only constant threat.

Nor does the press release mention the security-policy realities and the formal agreements between Israel and Lebanon, and between Israel and Syria, which have been established in cooperation with the United States and are intended to combat regional terrorism. Many Lebanese and Israeli civilians want lasting peace between them, and many regard the fight against Hezbollah as crucial to achieving it.

While the Abraham Accords between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan, together with the peace agreements with Egypt and Jordan, illustrate a growing regional recognition of the need for cooperation against Islamist terrorism and efforts towards peaceful relations between Israel and its neighbouring countries, Barth Eide’s statement appears asymmetrical. It is striking, but unfortunately not surprising, that the Foreign Minister fails to address Hezbollah’s terrorist activities against both the Lebanese and Israeli populations, and instead unilaterally criticises Israel’s defensive military operations.

There is reason to question whether such visit initiatives generate genuine added value in foreign policy, or whether they should primarily be regarded as symbolic actions of limited or even negative significance for Norwegian interests. There appears to be an assumption that Norway’s financial resources give us a continuing ability to buy our way out of political costs.

There is, however, cause for concern when the political leadership increasingly challenges the relationship with our most important ally through what may be perceived as a parallel foreign policy, which risks triggering strong counter-reactions from the United States. Norway’s decision to give full support to the controversial International Criminal Court (ICC), with Barth Eide as a driving force, stands in direct opposition to the positions in Washington and Jerusalem, both of which dispute the Court’s mandate in this context. By adopting such a high-profile position, the Norwegian government may subject the bilateral relationship with the United States to an unfortunate strain, as this is directly at odds with the policy of our principal ally, the United States.

The combination of such diplomatic choices and official invitations to representatives of authoritarian regimes sends problematic signals that do not go unnoticed either in the United States, Israel or other states in the Middle East allied with the United States – regional actors that regard Iran’s regional ambitions for power and Islamist terrorist organisations as their foremost security-policy challenge.

The symbolic significance of both Mahmoud Abbas and Iran’s ambassador Alireza Jahangiri being received as guests of honour at the King’s table, seen in conjunction with a perceived ambiguity in the government’s policy towards Hamas, as well as the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised the King against offering condolences to the Jews in connection with the 7 October massacre, is likewise not consistent with Norway’s attempt to be seen as a bridge-builder and peace mediator.

Rhetoric and realities

This discrepancy becomes particularly clear in the Foreign Minister’s statement upon the King’s death, shortly after the journey to Lebanon and Syria:

“Thank you for everything, King Harald. It was with deep sorrow that I received the news that our beloved King has passed away. King Harald taught us that Norway is a country built on trust, community and generosity. Over the years, I have been proud to represent abroad the Norway for which he stood. The nation knew the King as a generous and warm king for our country. I knew the King as a close and wise interlocutor, including during my weekly audiences at the Palace. I greatly appreciated the King’s wise thoughts on the course of world affairs. I will miss that. In my grief, I also feel a profound gratitude for a life devoted to Norway. My deepest sympathy goes to Queen Sonja and the entire Royal Family.”

From a rhetorical perspective, it is also striking how the Foreign Minister’s statement appears to centre on the minister’s exclusive access to the monarch. By using the personal pronoun “I” six times in a brief announcement, the focus shifts from the King’s unifying symbolic value to the Foreign Minister’s own position.

The values Barth Eide highlights – trust, community and generosity–stand in sharp contrast to the reality many Norwegian Jews experience today. These three qualities in particular have been conspicuous by their absence in the government’s dealings with the Jewish community following the 7 October massacre. This was the largest and most brutal attack on Jews since the Holocaust, an event that demanded unequivocal moral clarity from the country’s leadership.

It was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD) that advised the monarch against expressing the same official sympathy with the victims of the 7 October massacre as is customary in the case of other humanitarian disasters. So when Foreign Minister Barth Eide claims to represent the national values symbolised by the King, a legitimate question arises: Does this set of values also include the Jewish minority?

There is reason once again to call for clearer reflection from the silent Storting:

Does it benefit Norway in any way to continue with the current unbalanced Middle East policy?