Finally, we “white immigrants” were seen as a positive contribution.

And all those who were prioritised through DEI policies and quotas were suddenly calculated as an actual expense – not merely as an enrichment.

The Statistics Norway (SSB) figures presented by Nettavisen show that non-Western immigration costs the state at least NOK 4 billion net per year after tax revenues have been deducted. Do you believe that this is correct?

In order to ascertain this, we turn to the official figures that cannot be disputed – those reported by IMDi, Nav and UDI themselves.

In 2024, IMDi alone administered NOK 26.9 billion. Most of this is allocated as integration grants (integreringstilskudd) directly into municipal budgets. The funds are not earmarked – they are deposited into ordinary operations, and it is up to each municipality how the accounts are recorded. Some municipalities have previously regarded this as an economic opportunity. The reality often proves to be entirely different.

The Nav figures are clear: a total of NOK 11.6 billion in financial social assistance in 2024. 74 per cent – more than NOK 8.3 billion – went to immigrants. For all newly settled refugees, expenditures begin even before the introduction programme (introduksjonsprogrammet). They receive social assistance during the first months – normally up to approximately three months after settlement, when the programme commences. But where are the statistics on the use of state funds via Nav for work-related benefit measures (tiltakspenger) aimed at employment?

UDI spent almost NOK 3 billion on the operation of asylum reception centres, plus NOK 662 million in benefits to residents prior to settlement in 2024.

Health, schooling, child welfare services and other municipal services with additional resource requirements come in addition – which makes it impossible to determine the total cost.

And here comes the central question:

When so many billions are being spent – why does it not work?

Why does the bill continue to grow, even though Norway has had integration policies for several decades?

Does it have anything to do with the competence of those who are actually responsible for settlement and integration?

Has anyone carried out a proper national mapping of the competence of programme advisers (programrådgivere), refugee consultants (flyktningkonsulenter) and Nav employees who work directly with refugees? The closest is an assessment from IMDi in 2024, which shows that most have a social work background – often as social workers (sosionom) – but that there are identified gaps in legal understanding, system knowledge, labour market orientation and multicultural competence.

Within Nav, there is not even a dedicated, formal “Nav education” for this role. Recruitment takes place from various backgrounds, supplemented by internal courses.

It is therefore legitimate to ask: do these employees possess sufficient competence regarding religion, cultural differences and values that often come into conflict? And does this mean that the competence itself and the organisation of integration work constitute part of the problem?

But is it not the task of the state to run a business with a surplus? The state is, after all, to ensure welfare for all. As we see from municipal budgets, this no longer functions. The only question is: how long can the welfare model endure when expenditures grow faster than revenues – and when a large part of the growth comes from a group that statistically uses more than it contributes?

For this expenditure item ultimately falls upon everyone else who is here and contributes …