Several aspects of the case involving Alexander Karlsen — an employee in the police IT department who was stripped of his security clearance and thereby prevented from continuing in his role within the Norwegian Police IT unit — raise serious questions about the legal safeguards afforded to whistleblowers in the police, the state sector more broadly, and indeed in large organisations generally. Karlsen served as a workplace representative, so his union was actively involved. One would have expected the bar for dismissing him to be set considerably higher, yet the Security Act came to the aid of management. They chose to set aside the reasons for the revocation, even though Karlsen was entitled under that same Act to know what they were.

What makes the case interesting is that the person who decided in Karlsen’s favour, that he was entitled to know the reasons for his losing security clearance, was Astri Aas-Hansen. She was chair of the EOS Committee at the time. She wrote to Karlsen in December 2024.

When Karlsen did as she recommended and complained to the Ministry of Justice, he received a reply rejecting his request for access, signed by Minister of Justice Astri Aas-Hansen.

The rejection raises questions about both integrity and impartiality. Astri Aas-Hansen was, of course, disqualified from answering the letter, but her response shows that she has no integrity either.

It is the paw of Deep State Norway sticking out.

Karlsen was troublesome, and Astri Aas-Hansen had no intention of thwarting a dismissal based on formalities.

She probably thought it would be useful for another time. As an employer, if you have a law that you can use without the employees having a right of access, you have total power.

That’s Deep State Norway in free dress.

Addiction

Those who depend on security clearance are constantly walking a tightrope.

Officials in the ministries may hold a great deal of power.

Many in the ministries have recently had to undergo screening to get security clearance. They move at different levels. People work in the same department but have different security clearances. The more trusted, the higher the clearance.

But the greater the danger of slipping off. So you have to watch what you say on social media, for instance.

Consequences

What consequences does this have for public administration? Do employees take these restrictive attitudes into the public sphere and pass them on to the population? We hear of state administrators sending their auditors to the municipalities and, after reviewing them, criticising the municipal employees for being too friendly towards the population.

With a docile, fearful staff, it becomes easier to roll out the deep state. People don’t even notice it in broad daylight.

In this climate, whistleblowers are canaries in the coal mine. They’re seen as a nuisance, and if someone turns up who takes whistleblowing seriously, they’re in trouble.

Whistleblowing scheme

But today’s management wants to appear modern and innovative.

It was former Minister of Justice, Emilie Enger Mehl, who set up the police whistleblowing scheme. Originally, she came up with a proposal from the National Police Directorate that was so bad that the Norwegian Police Federation refused to cooperate. The ombudsman was to be incorporated into the police’s occupational health service, and no resources were allocated. This was during successor Benedicte Bjørnland’s time.

Mehl chose to place the whistleblower scheme under the civil law administration in Hamar. And so it was. But the fate of Alexander Karlsen means that there are still many questions hanging over the legal certainty for employees in the police.

Staff representative

In such a system, union representatives are caught in the middle.

He was hired in 2017, became a workplace representative and questioned the shift system, which he had views on. His complaints were not appreciated. Karlsen did not perceive it as a complaint. He wanted imbalances corrected.

Just after New Year 2022, Karlsen was working in a new position at the Monitoring Centre when his authorisation was suspended on suspicion of leaks to the media, which have never been documented or proven.

Karlsen went on 100 per cent sick leave in February 2022 and did not return until autumn 2023.

In the autumn of 2023, talks began with his employer to resume his duties at the Surveillance Centre.

He continues to blow the whistle: He’s now trying the whistleblowing channels at PwC, the Ministry of Justice, the whistleblowing ombudsman and directly to Police Commissioner Benedicte Bjørnland.

Now Karlsen has become a pain in the arse for management. Someone who doesn’t give in is easily diagnosed as a troublemaker, a meeting nuisance or a monomaniac.

Management has it all sewn up: They know Karlsen won’t back down. He’s digging his own grave. When his case comes before the courts, his complaints are labelled retaliation. Management counts 41 complaints and dozens of access requests.

In the last week of November, he was summoned to a meeting with a director of the police IT unit.

“I thought I was going to get new tasks. Instead, I was fired. It was like a bombshell.

Karlsen isn’t the first, and won’t be the last, troublesome employee government gets rid of. The same thing is happening in the private sector.

But this case is special because Astri Aas-Hansen, as chair of the EOS Committee, says Karlsen is entitled to know the reasons for the decision.

The committee expresses itself in a manner implying that it thinks the police are hiding behind national security concerns.

The committee then sent a critical letter to the Ministry of Justice, expressing “justified doubts” about whether the information could harm national security interests – and whether there was a legal basis for the deletion.

If the decision stands, the employer has been given the use of an instrument of power that renders the employee lawless.

Standing

Astri Aas-Hansen has sat on both sides of the table, which makes the letter even more remarkable.

The letter to Karlsen is from the Civilian Clearance Authority (SKM) – yet another of the new agencies with cryptic titles. The EOS Committee is also tasked with monitoring the use of the Security Act, and the Committee believed that Karlsen was entitled to know why he lost his security clearance, writing in a later letter that they had “justified doubts” as to whether the information could jeopardise national security.

In other words, the EOS Committee took the SKM Authority to task on behalf of an employee. It didn’t help. Karlsen lost his job, but received NOK 1.2 million as a sticking plaster. Surely a trifle in relation to expenses.

As usual, nobody in the Norwegian administration wants to say anything. The director who had Karlsen dismissed, Frode Josefsen, Director of Security and Emergency Preparedness at the Norwegian Police IT Unit, notified the SKM. He believed that Karlsen was sharing confidential information with the press.

This has never been documented. Was it a “hunch” on behalf of Josefson, and “swallowed” by the director of SKM, Gudmund Gjølstad?

A blunder becomes a weapon

Does the deleted part of the letter from SKM reveal that there was no substance to the claim, that it was based on loose assumptions?

The ministry is willing to deviate from legal principles under the law in order to save the agency’s honour and prestige.

Karlsen is paying the price, and SKM and the ministry are opening the door to further abuse of power.

This is how it has been done in the USA for a number of years.

No wonder the Norwegian elite hate Trump, who wants to take a stand against this form of abuse of power.

If it’s allowed to fester, it spreads like mushrooms after a rainstorm.

The Norwegian tabloid newspaper VG – Verdens Gang – has given an honourable review of the case and was present in Oslo District Court, where Karlsen had sued the Ministry of Justice for wrongful dismissal. The parties reached a settlement.

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